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DAVID NICOLAS 
Institut Jean Nicod 
EHESS - ENS - CNRS 
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Abstract There are two main approaches to the semantics of mass nouns 
(cf. Bunt 1985, Pelletier & Schubert 1989). One uses sets as their semantic values, 
the other uses mereological sums. Both face difficult problems, notably with sentences 
like The gold on the table weighs seven ounces (Bunt 1985) and The clay that made up 
those three bowls is identical with the clay that now makes up these two statues 
(cf. Cartwright 1965). We propose a new theory able to solve these problems, in a 
framework different from predicate logic, called plural logic. Our semantics is faithful 
to the intuition that, if there are eight pieces of silverware on a table, the speaker refers 
to eight things at once when he says: The silverware that is on the table 
comes from Italy . 
1. Introduction 
Former approaches to the semantics of mass nouns either use sets or mereological sums 
as their semantic values. They face serious difficulties (cf. Bunt 1985, Pelletier & 
Schubert 1989). To address those, we propose a new theory, in a framework different 
from predicate logic, called plural logic. 
2. Former approaches  
2.1. The set approach to mass nouns 
The set approach to mass nouns (e.g. Strawson 1959, Laycock 1972) treats them 
as  predicates. (1) This is wine is true if and only if I(this) Î I(wine), where I is the 
interpretation function, I(this) is what is demonstrated, and I(wine) is the set of 
everything that can be said to be wine. 
The question is then how to treat mass nouns in definite descriptions, as in 
(2) The gold on the table weighs fifty grams (Bunt 1985). If the description denotes 
the set having for element anything that is gold on the table, then how can we evaluate 
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the truth of the sentence? It would not do to give the sum of all weights. So we must 
impose restrictions on the elements of the set I(the gold on the table). 
Now comes a second difficulty concerning identity over time. Consider: 
(3) The clay that made up those three bowls is identical with the clay that now makes 
up these two statues. Which set could make I(the clay that made up those three bowls) 
= I(the clay that now makes up these two statues) true? 
What about the set of all minimal parts of gold, i.e. the set of all the instances of 
gold that have no other instance of gold as part? However, with mass nouns 
like garbage, it is not clear what the minimal parts would be (cf. Pelletier & Schubert). 
Moreover, mass nouns like time  and space  do not seem to have minimal parts. 
So the semantics of mass nouns should not require them to have some. 
2.2. The mereological approach to mass nouns  
The mereological (or lattice-theoretic) approach to mass nouns (e.g. Link 1983, 
Gillon 1992) focuses first on mass nouns in definite descriptions. When M is a mass 
noun, it takes the define noun phrase the M that Qs to refer to the mereological sum of 
everything that is  some M that Qs. It is such a sum that is weighted in sentence (2), and 
whose identity over time is asserted in (3). 
But (1)  must still be dealt with. The proposal is this. (1) is true if and only if 
I(this) £  I(wine), where £ is the relation of parthood, I(this) is what is demonstrated, and 
I(wine) is the mereological sum of everything that is wine. 
This yields a new problem with minimal parts. An atom of hydrogen is not water, 
though it is part of a molecule of H2O . More strikingly, a leg of a chair is not furniture, 
though it is part of a chair, and a chair is some furniture (Bunt 1985). 
Moreover, sentences containing mass nouns (just like sentences containing 
plurals) are liable to so-called collective, distributive, and intermediate construals 
(cf. Gillon). Thus, (4) This silverware costs a hundred euros may be true if the 
silverware costs, all together, a hundred euros (collective construal). It may be true if 
each piece of silverware costs a hundred euros (distributive construal). It may also be 
true if the silverware demonstrated consists in two sets of silverware, each set costing a 
hundred euros (intermediate construal). To capture these construals, a notion of 
covering akin to that proposed by Gillon is needed, and to express this notion, 
the apparatus of sets, or something as expressive, is required: mereological sums are not 
enough. Gillon’s approach is thus mixed, being based on mereological sums, but using 
sets for coverings. (NB: Gillon uses the term aggregation instead of covering .) 
The mereological approach (be it Link’s or Gillon’s) faces two additional, 
independent problems. Consider a sentence that could be taken from Animal farm, 
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George Orwell’s novel: (5) The livestock met on the hill. The approach takes it to 
be true if and only if the mereological sum of the livestock met on the hill. But the 
right-hand side of this bi-conditional is in fact very odd: the English predicate meet 
does not seem to apply to mereological sums. 
Finally, in a given circumstance, it may be that the mereological sum of the M is 
identical with the sum of the N (where M and N are two mass nouns), yet the sentences 
The M Qs and The N Qs have, intuitively, opposite truth-values. Thus, suppose that 
some wood of a given kind (e.g. some elm) is used to make furniture of different styles. 
Then intuitively, the sentence (6) The furniture is heterogeneous would be true, while 
(7) The wood is heterogeneous would be false. But furniture and wood have the 
same  sum, so the theory predicts that (6) and (7) should have the same truth-value. 
3. A new approach based on plural logic 
We propose a new approach to solve these difficulties. Its starting point is the intuition 
that, if there are three solid bits of gold on the table, then the subject noun phrase of 
sentence (2) refers to three things at once. It is these three things that are jointly 
weighted. This makes mass nouns very similar to plurals, though not identical 
with them. (NB: Mass nouns are invariable in grammatical number. Therefore, it is 
coherent to suppose that number has no semantic value with these nouns.1) 
Now, Oliver & Smiley (2001) and Rayo (2002) have shown that, if we 
acknowledge that it is possible to quantify over absolutely everything there is, the 
semantics of plurals should not be characterized using predicate logic and sets. Indeed, 
some intelligible sentences containing plurals would be represented in a contradictory 
way. On the other hand, if one employed mereological sums and predicate logic, the 
semantics of plurals would turn out to be too weak. To avoid this, they propose to use 
plural logic. Plural logic contains plural terms (like ‘as’) that can refer to several things 
at once (to a “plurality of things”). A sentence where the predicate applies to a plural 
term is true when the objects that interpret the term satisfy together (collectively) 
the predicate. Plural logic also contains “superplural” terms (like ‘css’), which can 
                                                               
1 A difference between English and French confirms this. In English, mass nouns tolerate only determiners 
that can also be used with plurals: some, all, any, the. Not so in French, where the determiner must be 
singular: de l’or / *des or (some gold), tout or / *tous or (all / any gold), l’or / *les or (the gold). 
Moreover, mass expressions and plurals often seem to be co-referential: The silverware is in the drawer / 
The pieces of silverware are in the drawer. Strikingly, French possesses both a mass noun (mobilier) and 
a count noun (meuble) that refer to pieces of furniture. 
Like their invariability with respect to number, all these data suggest that grammatical number has no 
semantic implications for mass nouns. 
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refer to “several pluralities” at once.2 
We use plural logic to have a common framework for mass nouns and plurals, in 
which a mass expression may refer to several things at once. The denotation of a mass 
noun M is identified by a plural term, ‘ds’: some thing is M just in case it is one 
of the ds. Then sentence (1) is true just in case the things referred to by this are 
among the ds. 
To deal with examples like (6) and (7), we first remark that if the furniture is cut 
into pieces, it is destroyed, but the wood remains. So a semantics of mass nouns should 
not identify furniture and wood. Typically, the parthood relation is taken to be 
extensional, which forces the identification of the two (Parsons 1970). To avoid this, 
we make the parthood relation a partial ordering, but require it to satisfy the axiom 
of strong complementation (cf.  Simons 1987) only relative to any given mass noun M: 
"u "v ((Mu Ù  Mv Ù  Ø (u £ v)) ® $ x (Mx Ù  x £ u Ù Ø$y (y £  x Ù  y £ v))) 
In this way, our theory can coherently deny that the furniture is identical to the wood 
that makes it up. 
The remaining problems concern definite descriptions. They are dealt with by 
requiring mass nouns to satisfy additional axioms (which are stated precisely 
in the Appendix). A definite mass noun phrase like the gold on the table refers to 
several things, the as. The axioms say that each of them is  M (e.g., each is gold), self-
connected (of a single piece, cf. Casati & Varzi 1999), and maximal for the relation of 
parthood. Each is, for instance, one of the solid bits of gold that are on the table. 
The interpretation of (2) is then relative to the choice of a covering of the as. 
A covering of the as is given by a “plurality of pluralities”, the css. The sentence says, 
of each “plurality” of this covering, that the things that make up this “plurality” weigh 
seven ounces together. Among the various construals of the sentence, the collective one 
is of course the most salient (the other construals requiring much more context to 
become available). It is obtained when the covering contains only one “plurality”, 
the as themselves. The sentence says that the as (the solid bits of gold) weigh seven 
ounces together.  
This applies straightforwardly to (4), which indeed motivated the need 
for coverings, and to (5). It also yields a satisfactory semantics for (3). The sentence is 
made true by a suitable choice of covering, the css, each of which is some clay that has 
retained its identity over time. (This does not require the existence of minimal parts.) 
At a previous time, the css together made up three bowls. They have been rearranged, 
                                                               
2 This is only loosely speaking. In plural logic, no object is a “plurality” or a “plurality of pluralities”. 
But plural logic contains stronger forms of reference than singular reference: plural reference (to several 
things at  once), and superplural reference (on the latter see Rayo 2006 and Linnebo & Nicolas 2008). 
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shuffled, so as to now make up two statues. 
Moreover, the framework also applies to quantified statements, like 
(8) All phosphorus is either red or black . Roeper (1983) thought that this kind of 
example was problematic for set-theoretic approaches of mass nouns. In the present 
account, the sentence is made true by a covering that is a bi-partition of all 
the phosphorus, such that the bits of phosphorus in one “plurality” of this covering 
are red, while the other bits of phosphorus are black.  
4. Conclusion 
Set-theoretic and mereological approaches to the semantics of mass nouns face difficult 
problems, notably with sentences (1) to (8). Using plural logic, we have proposed an 
account able to solve these difficulties. The key was to define a notion of covering 
applicable to things that do not have a mereological sum. This allowed us to devise a 
semantics where mass nouns may refer to several things at once, while dealing 
satisfactorily with these difficulties. (For considerably more details from a partly 
different perspective, and for acknowledgements, see Nicolas, manuscript.) This 
semantics is faithful to the intuition that, if there are eight pieces of silverware on 
a table, the speaker refers to eight things at once when he says (9) The silverware that is 
on the table comes from Italy , and that in this particular case, he might as well have said 
(10) The pieces of silverware that are on the table come from Italy. 
5. Appendix: main technical notions employed in our semantics for mass nouns  
Maximal elements: 
ys = max[zs / Qzs] º def "zs "u ((Qzs Ù u Ð zs) ® $v (v Ð ys Ù u £ v)) 
   Ù  "v (v Ð ys ® $zs (v Ð zs Ù  Qzs)) Ù Ø($u $v (u Ð ys Ù  v Ð ys Ù u ¹  v Ù  Ouv)) 
Among the zs that Q, the ys are the maximal elements for the relation of parthood. 
Axioms: 
"zs (Mzs ® "x ((x Ð zs) ® Mx))   If some things are M, each of them is M. 
"x (Mx ® self-connected(x))    If something is M, it is self-connected. 
$zs (Mzs Ù  Qzs) ® $ys (ys = max[zs / Mzs Ù Qzs]) 
Guarantees that the gold on the table refers to the three solid bits of gold on the table. 
Covering: the css are a covering of the as just in case: 
i)  Any of the css is M: "x (x Ð° css ® Mx) 
ii) For anything x, x overlaps one of the css iff x overlaps one of the as: 
"x ($v (v Ð° css Ù  Oxv) « $w (w Ð as Ù  Oxw))  
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Truth-conditions of a sentence of the form ‘The M that Qs Ps’: 
Let the as be the denotation of the M that Qs. They satisfy: as = max[zs / Mzs  Ù Qzs]. 
The interpretation of the sentence depends on the choice of a covering of the as. 
Let the css be the chosen covering. The sentence is true if and only if the predicate P 
applies to “each plurality” in the covering: "ys (ys Ð’ css ® Pys) 
Truth-conditions of ‘All M Ps’: 
Let the ds be the denotation of the mass noun M. The interpretation of the sentence is 
relative to the choice of a covering of the ds containing at least two “pluralities”. 
Let the css be the chosen covering. The sentence is true if and only if the predicate P 
applies to “each plurality” in the covering: "ys (ys Ð’ css ® Pys) 
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